Quality of earnings questions arise when firms that practice conservative accounting change the level of investment; growth in investment reduces reported earnings, creating reserves, and reduction of investment releases those reserves, increasing earnings. If the change in investment is temporary, current earnings is temporarily depressed or inflated, so is not a good indicator of future earnings. This paper develops diagnostics that capture this joint effect of investment and conservative accounting and finds that the diagnostics forecast differences in future return on net operating assets relative to current return on net operating assets. Moreover, the diagnostics forecast stock returns, indicating that the stock market does not appreciate how conservatism and investment combine to raise quality questions about reported earnings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the considerable research on the quality of earnings deals with the effects of changes in accounting principles or estimates. 1 Firms are seen as temporarily increasing earnings by reducing estimates of the valuation reserve for deferred tax assets or the allowance for doubtful accounts, for example. Or, to lower earnings (and bleed them back to the future), firms overestimate a restructuring charge. If the effect is temporary (and so reverses later), reported earnings are deemed to be of poor quality because they are not a good indicator of subsequent earnings. Correspondingly, quality concerns are reduced if accounting principles and estimates are applied on a consistent basis, period to period. This paper shows empirically that quality concerns also arise if firms apply conservative accounting on a consistent basis (without any change in accounting methods or estimates).
Conservative accounting interacts with investment: growth in investment reduces earnings and a slowing of investment increases earnings. If the change in investment growth is temporary, conservative accounting yields lower quality earnings. The paper also shows that the stock market does not appear to price the lower quality earnings appropriately.
The term "quality of earnings" has no established meaning and has been used with different interpretations. We examine the issue from the point of view of an analyst wishing to forecast future earnings. We define the term to mean that reported earnings, purged of extraordinary items identified on the income statement, is of good quality if it is a good indicator of future earnings that is forecasted from all information available. Thus we have in mind the notion of "sustainable earnings" that is often referred to in financial analysis. Correspondingly, unsustainable earnings produced by an accounting treatment are deemed to be of poor quality.
We view earnings forecasts as an input to equity valuation. So we interpret the market as misinterpreting the quality of earnings when pricing firms if it fails, given the information available, to see that reported earnings is not sustainable in the future. This view of market inefficiency has been referred to as "fixation" on reported earnings, so, in those terms, we examine whether the market is fixated on reported earnings, unaware that they may be of doubtful quality because of conservative accounting.
By conservative accounting we mean the practice, consistently applied, that keeps the book values of net assets relatively low. So LIFO accounting for inventories is conservative relative to FIFO (if inventory costs are increasing); expensing research and development (R&D) expenditures rather than capitalizing and amortizing them is conservative; depreciation methods using short estimated asset lives (so as to record depreciation in excess of economic depreciation) are conservative; and policies that consistently overestimate allowances for doubtful accounts, sales returns or warranty liabilities are conservative.
Conservative accounting raises questions, not only about the quality of the balance sheet, but also about the quality of the income statement.
2 Earnings quality questions arise with conservative accounting because, with growth in investment, earnings are indeed lower than otherwise. But these lower earnings create unrecorded reserves that enhance the ability of the firm to report more income in the future. These reserves can be increased, reducing earnings, by increasing investment. And the reserves can be released, creating earnings, by subsequently reducing investment or reducing the rate of growth in investment. If the change in investment is temporary, the induced change in earnings is also temporary and not indicative of subsequent earnings. So the quality of earnings is called into question as a result of real activity and accounting policy rather than changes in accounting methods and estimates. Manipulation and earnings management may or may not be intended by management but, if intended, the effect is achieved by an understanding of the joint effect of real activity and accounting policy. The effect is perverse: reducing investment reduces future earnings from investments but, with conservative accounting, increases current earnings, making them a poor indicator of future earnings.
We have two research questions. First, are temporary changes in earnings associated with conservative accounting and investment indeed observed? And, second, does the stock market price these temporary earnings as if they are indeed unsustainable? The answer to the first question appears to be yes. The answer to the second is no. In carrying out the analysis we develop indexes that indicate the quality of earnings, as an aid to financial analysis and research.
Additional investment typically yields additional earnings, so anticipated future earnings differ from current earnings with changes in investment. Thus, to examine the sustainability of earnings, we focus on accounting rates of return, that is, earnings relative to net assets that deflates earnings for new net investment. This focus also serves our purpose of investigating stock market's pricing of earnings of varying quality. Accrual-accounting residual income valuation models dictate that forecasted earnings are evaluated with reference to the book values that generate them, and so describe intrinsic equity values as being determined by anticipated accounting rates of return. Pricing errors occur if the market, relying on the current rate of return, forecasts future rates of return incorrectly.
The paper is organized as follows. As a background to the analysis, the next section outlines the effects of conservative accounting and investment growth on accounting rates of return. Section III develops metrics for scoring firms on their conservative accounting and the quality of their earnings, and Section IV summarizes the data. Sections V and VI address the two research questions. Section V investigates whether the sustainability of accounting rates of return can be diagnosed with the quality scores that capture the effect of conservative accounting and investment. Section VI documents the stock returns to taking positions in stocks on the basis of the quality diagnosis. A summary of the conclusions is in Section VII.
II. CONSERVATISM, INVESTMENT, ACOCUNTING RATES OF RETURN, AND THE QUALITY OF EARNINGS
Researchers have introduced a variety of definitions of conservative accounting. Some, like Basu (1997) , define conservatism as the practice of reducing earnings (and writing down net assets) in response to "bad news" but not increasing earnings (and writing up net assets) in response to "good news." In the accounting-based valuation literature, researchers often refer to Feltham and Ohlson (1995) who characterize conservative or "biased" accounting as an expectation that reported net assets will be less than market value in the long run. That definition classifies the accounting for anticipated positive net-present-value investments at historical cost as conservative accounting, because those investments are expected to be carried at less than their value. Zhang (2000) models conservative accounting and valuation from this perspective.
Beaver and Ryan (2000) evoke a similar concept with conservatism (or bias) being a persistent difference between market value and book value, in contrast to a temporary difference due to economic gains and losses being recognized in book value gradually over time. Gjesdal (1999) distinguishes "economic profitability" from accounting profitability such that the accounting for investments is conservative if it gives them a carrying value that yields an expected accounting rate of return greater than the internal rate of return on their cost. So, for example, conservative accounting follows the practice of carrying an asset whose value is equal to its historical cost (a zero net present value investment) at less than historical cost.
Our notion of conservatism follows the latter definition; that is, it concerns biased application of historical cost accounting. 3 But, for our purposes, we do not have to establish unbiased historical-cost carrying values of investments or unbiased allocations of investment cost to match against revenues. Rather, we examine conservatism in a relative sense such that one practice (for example, LIFO accounting) is considered more conservative relative to another (FIFO accounting) if the accumulated earnings it yields are less than those for the alternative, and consequently the carrying values it yields are always less.
The literature is clear about the effect of conservative accounting on accounting rates of return. If net assets do not change over a period, conservative accounting has no effect on earnings in the numerator of a rate of return. But, as net assets in the denominator are lower, the rate of return is higher. But Greenball (1969) shows that conservative accounting (bias) interacts with growth: conservative accounting reduces earnings when there is growth in net assets so that accounting rates of return are lower than in the no growth case. Beaver and Ryan (2000) and Zhang (2001) model the interaction of conservatism and growth in a valuation context.
Our concern is not with the effect of conservatism and growth on accounting rates of return, but with the effects of changes in growth. Conservatism and growth do not necessarily raise quality issues in forecasting for, if a firm is projected to maintain growth in net assets at the current level, future rates of return are expected, ceteris paribus, to be the same as the current rate of return. However, should the firm reduce its investment in assets that are subject to conservative accounting, it increases its rate of return. And, if this reduction in investment is temporary, so is the increase in the rate of return, so the current rate of return is not a good indicator of future rates of return.
The effect of the interaction between conservative accounting and changes in investment on earnings is best illustrated in the case of LIFO accounting for inventories for which the dollar effect of the interaction is transparent in the LIFO reserve disclosure in footnotes to U.S. The same phenomena are produced --less transparently --by all forms of conservative accounting. Accelerated depreciation from using short estimated asset lives (that reports lower net asset values) has no effect on earnings if depreciable assets are not growing, but reduces earnings (and, like LIFO, creates reserves) if investment in the assets increase, ceteris paribus.
(It is the growth case that people must have in mind when they assert that conservative accounting reports lower earnings). If investments decline, accelerated depreciation creates earnings through the liquidation of reserves. Immediate expensing of R&D expenditures and advertising is conservative (setting knowledge assets and brand assets to zero on the balance sheet), but has no effect on earnings relative to capitalizing and amortizing the expenditures if the expenditures are not growing. However, increasing R&D investments and advertising with immediate expensing depresses earnings and increases reserves, and slowing them increases earnings and reduces reserves. 5 Because these reserves are not transparent they are a form of hidden reserves that can be released into earnings.
Quality of earnings issues arises, then, if a change in a reported accounting rate of return that is induced by a change in investment is temporary. If an analyst accepts the current book rate of return as an indicator of future rates of return, he or she will be misled if the reported rate of return is temporarily affected by the interaction of conservative accounting and investment activity. But, if the analyst penetrates the joint effect, he or she will discover the reported number to be a poor quality indicator of long-run "sustainable" profitability. And "quality of valuation" issues also arise if valuations are made from forecasts of earnings. This follows directly, if an investor follows the prescription of residual earnings valuation models and so forecasts future book rates of return to value firms. Cash flow valuations usually forecast earnings also, in order to predict future cash flow.
Our empirical analysis, then, documents the incidence of these temporary effects on accounting rates of return, and asks whether the market pricing of stocks is consistent with investors appreciating the quality of earnings in valuing stocks.
III. INDEXES OF CONSERVATISM AND EARNINGS QUALITY
We see the determination of the quality of earnings as a matter of appropriate financial statement analysis, and so develop two indexes from financial statements to capture the phenomenon we have in mind. The first scores the degree of application of conservative accounting by firms. The second scores the quality of earnings that results from the joint effect of conservatism and investment activity.
Conservatism Index (C-score)
The C-score measures the effect of the application of conservative accounting on the RD is calculated as the estimated amortized R&D assets that would have been on the balance sheet if R&D had not been expensed. We capitalize R&D expenditures, then amortize them using the industry coefficients estimated by Lev and Sougiannis (1996) . In a sensitivity analysis, we also amortize using the sum-of-the-years-digits method over five years.
ADV is calculated as estimated brand assets created by advertising expenditures. Advertising expenses are capitalized and amortized using a sum-of-the-year's digits' method over two years. Bublitz and Ettredge (1989) and Hall (1993) indicate a short useful life for advertising, typically one to two years.
Each component of the reserve can be used to calculate a subscore, the estimated reserve component relative to NOA.
Earnings Quality Indicator (Q-score)
While the C-score measures the effect of conservative accounting on the balance sheet, the Q-score measures the effect of conservative accounting on earnings in the income statement. That is,
A it Q is the change in C it. So a firm's Q A score is greater than zero if it builds up its reserve at a faster rate than the growth in net operating assets, and less than zero if it decreases its reserve at a slower rate. 8 The second measure,
Q compares a firm's C-score to the median for its SIC two-digit industry:
The Q-score combines these two measures:
Note that the Q-score is not a measure that ranks firms ordinarily on their earnings quality. Both "high" (positive) and "low" (negative) Q-scores can indicate that current earnings are of poor quality, and a Q-score of zero indicates good quality. Subscores were calculated from C-scores for inventories, R&D, and advertising.
The change in estimated reserves measures the effect of conservative accounting and investment on current earnings. But, for analyzing the quality of those earnings, the focus is on forecasting. So the question is whether this effect is temporary. If, for example, a firm were to increase its reserve by growing investments but was expected to continue that growth in the future, the effect would not be temporary. By benchmarking the change in the reserve against the change in net operating assets in the Q A measure, we posit that the growth in the reserve (unrecorded assets) is unusual if it differs from the growth in (recorded) net operating assets.
With the Q B measure, the aim, too, is to develop forecasts. We posit that, if a firm's buildup of reserves relative to net operating assets, its C-score, is different from the industry median, it will likely revert towards the median in the future. That is, the score is likely to be temporary. If, for example, a high C-score subsequently reverts towards the median, estimated reserves are released into earnings.
It is with some speculation, then, that we proceed with these Q-scores. Our tests must be seen as joint tests of the phenomenon under investigation and of the ability of our scoring to capture it. If we find that Q-scores do identify the phenomenon, we will have not only documented the phenomenon but also will have validated a useful diagnostic for the purpose, as an aid to financial statement analysis. With agnosticism (before addressing the data) about which measure might best capture temporary earnings effects, we weight the two measures equally. In our sensitivity analysis, we change the weights from (0.5, 0.5) to (1, 0) and 0, 1), so investigate Q A and Q B separately.
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION
C-scores and Q-scores were calculated for NYSE and AMEX non-financial firms on the combined COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial and Research files (which include nonsurvivors) for . Monthly stock returns were obtained from 1997 CRSP files. Our sample period begins in 1975 because, prior to that year, accounting data to construct the indexes were missing for a significant number of firms on COMPUSTAT.
Of the 46,955 non-financial NYSE and AMEX traded firm-years with share price, shares outstanding, and book value of common equity on COMPUSTAT from 1975-97, NOA could be calculated for 46,854 of them. Of these, 46,122 had positive NOA, and C-scores could be calculated for 38,540 of them. Firm-years were deleted if none of the three sub-scores could be calculated from the COMPUSTAT data. When only some of the subscores were missing, we used industry median subscores (for 2-digit SIC industry groups) as substitutes to calculate the overall C-score for that firm-year. The 38,540 firm-years were made up as follows:
Firm-years with 1 subscore 8,285
Firm-years with 2 subscores 19,258
Firm-years with 3 sub-scores 10,997
Total firm-years 38,540
Of these 38,540 firm-years, the LIFO reserve was available for 36,244 of them, 13,931
cases of firms on LIFO and 22,313 non-LIFO cases (where the reserve is zero). The R&D reserve could be calculated for 25,357 firm-years and the advertising reserve could be calculated for 18,191 firm-years. Q + (in the subsequent year) is 0.88, decaying to 0.63 five years ahead. These statistics indicate that both the Q A and Q B scores are not permanent features of firms. But they also indicate that, while the Q B score does revert towards the median, the Q A score is very much a "one-time" feature so more likely to capture the temporary affect on earnings that we wish to identify. As indicated above, we report results for both measures.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE QUALITY OF BOOK RATES OF RETURN
If the Q-score identifies temporary effects on earnings, a relatively high Q-score should indicate current profitability that is lower than that expected in the future and a relatively low Qscore should indicate current profitability that is higher than that expected in the future. We examine how Q-scores predict changes in core return on net operating assets from its current level. Core return on net operating assets is calculated as Core RNOA it = [Core operating income it x (1 − statutory tax rate it )]/average NOA it.
Core operating income is operating income before interest, special items, and extraordinary items and discontinued operations, so excludes items that are transparent on the income statement as (presumably) temporary components of earnings, along with interest expense which is not generated by operations and which is not affected by conservative accounting. Thus, we identify reported income that the investor might identify as sustainable income from operations in the future. After-tax core operating income is measured without an allocation of taxes between operating and financing activities. Any deviation of effective tax rates on operating income from statutory rates (calculated as the Federal rate + 2%) is deemed temporary.
To conduct the analysis, firms were sorted in each year of the period, 1976-96, and within each 2-digit SIC industry, into 10 equal-sized groups based on the core RNOA they reported for the year. Only RNOA groups with at least three firms were retained. Then, within each RNOA group, firms were further divided into three equal-sized groups based on their Q-scores. We refer to these as high, median and low Q-score groups. Core RNOA in the base year are compared, for each Q group, with that realized in subsequent years. The grouping controls for the type of operations, so accounting differences are observed for firms with similar operations.
The grouping also controls for the mean reversion in RNOA documented in Nissim and Penman (2001) , so that RNOA behavior identified with Q-scores does not just reflect this typical behavior. Table 2 summarizes median core RNOA for the 5 years before and after the year of the grouping, Year 0, for each of these Q-score groups and all firms together. The numbers in the panel are means of medians for the 21 calendar years for which the grouping was done. Figure   1a tracks these means for the high and low Q-score groups diagrammatically. Figure 1b tracks these same means, but with for the median RNOA for all firms in the year subtracted from the RNOAs in each year, so adjusting for trends in median RNOA over time.
The results in Table 2 Two sets of significance tests are reported in Table 2 . For the first set, median differences in core RNOA between Year 0 and each of the five years prior to and subsequent to Year 0 were calculated for high-Q, medium-Q and low-Q groups for each of the 21 years. The table gives the mean of these median differences over the 21 years, along with a t-statistic on those mean differences (based on a standard error of the mean estimated from the time series of median differences). The second set of t-tests is on means of differences between the differences in core RNOA (in year 0 and the relevant year) for high and low Q groups. The two sets of tstatistics indicate that the mean RNOA for the low-Q groups in the five years subsequent to Year 0 are statistically significantly less than that in Year 0, and that the change from Year 0 is statistically less than that for the high-Q groups. The size of the differences --over 1% --indicate that they are also economically significant differences. 9 Of the firms with low-Q that survived through Year +1, 44.2% had increasing RNOA in Year +1, compared to 52.5% for high-Q firms. For a classification of high-Q and low-Q firms into those with increasing and decreasing core RNOA in Year 1, the Chi-square statistic is 73.9, with a probability given no relationship between Q and subsequent profitability of less than 0.001. The analysis in Table 2 was repeated for the subperiods, 1976-82, 1983-89, and 1990-96 , with similar results in each period.
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The findings complement those in Sloan (1996) . His analysis suggests that subsequent changes in profitability are higher if current earnings have a higher accrual component relative to the cash component. 11 Accruals are the subject of estimates so his work refers to quality questions that arise from the use of estimates. The analysis here deals with a different quality concern, the joint effect of investment and conservative accounting.
Some Checks and Further Analysis
We performed further tests to provide additional controls, to document the robustness of the findings over time and over Q subscores, and to explore the phenomenon further. These tests are summarized below; more detail is available on request.
Control for Mean Reversion in Core RNOA
We have attempted to control for the typical mean reversion of RNOA. But some of the differential behavior of core RNOA across Q-score groups might be attributable to differential behavior of different levels of RNOA if Q-scores are strongly correlated with RNOA (and thus the ranking on Q-scores is effectively a ranking on RNOA). The median Spearman correlation between Q-scores and RNOA within RNOA groups is 0.00, and the mean correlation is 0.10.
The 75 th percentile of rank correlation is 0.42. 12 In any case, the analysis in Table 2 was repeated with a ranking on core RNOA within each RNOA group, then splitting into three RNOA groups rather than on Q-scores. There was little difference in the RNOA dynamics for these RNOA groups.
Analysis of Subscores
An analysis identical to that in Table 2 was performed with Q-scores calculated separately for inventory, R&D and advertising. Results are similar for each subscore so the results are not due to one particular accounting item. Table 3 gives further insights. Panel A repeats the tests in Table 2 but in the form of estimated linear regressions of one-year ahead core RNOA (in t+1) over core RNOA and Q-scores in the scoring year, t. The positive mean estimated coefficient for the Q-score and its t-statistic indicate that the Q-score improves forecasts of subsequent RNOA over that from the current RNOA alone. Panel B breaks out the Q-score into its three subscores. The results indicate that each subscore provides additional information about subsequent RNOA, not only over current RNOA, but also relative to each other.
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Analysis of Q A and Q
B
The analysis in Tables 2 and 3 is based on a Q-score that weights Q A and Q B equally. As explained in Section III, both of these measures were constructed with the purpose of identifying temporary changes in reserves generated by conservative accounting. But their ability to do so was speculative, to be resolved by empirical analysis. The empirical analysis resolves the question as to whether these constructions work as financial statement analysis tools.
We repeated the tests in Table 2 for both Q A and Q B . Although Q A produced slightly stronger results than Q B , both discriminate on changes in future core RNOA from current levels.
The mean changes in RNOA in Years +1 to +5 from Year 0 for the low-Q A group were -0.95%, -1.03%, 1.19%, -1.16%, and -1.11%, respectively and, for the low-Q B group were -0.68%, -0.99%, -1.42%, -1.49%, and -1.70%, all with t-statistics of the same order as those in Table 2 .
For the high Q groups, results were stronger for the Q A metric, with mean RNOA increasing by 0.65% in Year +1 with a t-statistic of 1.78, significant of the 0.05 level for a one-tail test.
We also repeated the regression tests in Table 3 
Control for Growth in Net Operating Assets
In their critique of Sloan (1996) , Fairfield, Whisenant and Yohn (2000) show that growth in net operating assets reduces future profitability and that Sloan's observation that high (low) accruals are followed by lower (higher) profitability is due to the positive correlation between growth and accruals. The Q A -score measures the rate of change in estimated reserves relative to the rate of change in net-operating assets, so benchmarks growth in estimated reserves (from unrecorded assets) against growth in recorded assets, for the reasons articulated earlier.
However, growth in net operating assets clearly affects the calculation.
The observation that growth in net operating assets reduces future profitability is consistent with the use of conservative accounting. If, for investments that are booked on the balance sheet, subsequent amortization rates are high (in application of conservative accounting), subsequent profitability is reduced by asset growth, at least in the near term. As the Q-score captures the growth, it incorporates, for forecasting purposes, this effect of conservative accounting. But in this paper we are concerned with growth in the unrecorded assets (the reserve) so the attribution of the results to this effect is conditional.
For the conditional analysis, we estimated the cross-sectional regressions in panel A of Table 3 , but with the rate of growth in net operating assets added as an additional explanatory variable. Growth in net operating assets indeed forecasts charges in core RNOA (with a statistically significant negative mean estimated coefficient), but the Q-score provides incremental information (with a statistically significant, positive mean coefficient).
Further Analysis of the RNOA Changes
Core RNOA equals core profit margin (core operating income/sales) multiplied by asset turnover (sales/net operating assets). Table 4 reports core profit margins and asset turnovers for the five years before and after the Q-scoring year for high and low Q groups in the same way as Table 2 . As the accounting for inventories, R&D and advertising does not affect depreciation and amortization, profit margins are before these items.
It is clear that the average changes in profit margins from Year 0 to subsequent years are different for the low-Q groups than for the high-Q groups, and significantly so. Those for the high-Q groups increase while those for low-Q groups fall. Of the firms that survived through Year +1, 49.8% of low-Q firms had increasing profit margins in Year +1 compared to 55.1% of high-Q firms. 14 We also performed this analysis for core profit margins before R&D and advertising expense (and depreciation and amortization). For the low-Q group, these margins declined in Year 0 on average (while those after R& D and advertising expense increased). So, lower R&D and advertising expenditures turned decreasing mean margins into increasing margins. For high-Q firm, the mean margins before R&D and advertising were increasing in Year 0, and continued to increase subsequently.
Mean asset turnovers for high-Q firms in Table 4 increase in years subsequent to Year 0, but decline for low-Q firms. So the Q-score indicates differences in changes in asset turnovers, as well as margins. Note, further, that mean asset turnovers for low-Q firms decline also in Year 0. LIFO dipping does not affect sales, the numerator of the asset turnover, but reduces inventory in net operating assets in the denominator. So LIFO dipping increases the asset turnover, holding sales constant. R&D and advertising expenditures have no effect on the asset turnover.
As the mean asset turnover for low-Q groups declines in Year 0 (reducing RNOA), it appears that the core RNOA created by low-Q firms in Year 0 is a profit margin effect. Given the effect of LIFO dipping and R&D and advertising on net operating assets, the decline in asset turnovers for low-Q firms in Year 0 is driven by sales increasing at a slower rate than net operating assets.
So it appears that the low-Q firms are increasing profit margins and maintaining core RNOA in Year 0 at the level of high-Q firms, on average, even though sales growth relative to the growth net operating assets is declining. Further, the decline in asset turnover continues subsequently, on average. Asset turnovers for high-Q groups increase in Year 0. So changes in turnover are related to earnings quality, as in but for different reasons.
Analysis of Changes in Investment
To corroborate that changes in Q are indeed due to changes in investment, we tracked the investment in inventory, R&D and advertising. For these three items, changes in reserves due to conservative accounting result from changes in dollar investment. So we tracked cumulative (compounded) growth rates of estimated reserves for high and low Q groups for years −5 to +5.
The average growth rates for the low-Q groups declined in years up to and including Year 0, and were lower than those for high-Q firms. However, they converged towards the high-Q growth rates subsequently, indicating that the slowing of investment growth up to Year 0 was indeed temporary, increasing earnings, profit margins and RNOA temporarily.
There is one qualification to our interpretation of the results. Firms that reduce investment or the rate of growth in investment can do so in anticipation of lower profitability of new projects. Therefore the lower RNOA subsequent to year 0 for low-Q firms may reflect lower project profitability. The findings that the decline in investment is temporary, argue against this interpretation. And the conservatism effect is at work, ceteris paribus, by the construction of the accounting. In any case, an anticipated change in profitability from current profitability for any reason is a quality of earnings issue, and the results indicate the Q-score discriminates on quality (for any reason).
Survivorship
Non-surviving firms are included in the analysis for years +1 to +5 only if they survive to the respective years. The number of firms included in the analysis for each of these years is given at the bottom of 
VI. THE RETURNS TO QUALITY ANALYSIS
We now investigate whether the stock market prices stocks as if it appreciates the differential quality of earnings that is indicated by our Q-score. To conduct this investigation, we take investment positions in stocks in the sample period based on their Q-scores and observe whether these positions earn differential returns, adjusting for conjectured risk differentials. Table 5 gives raw returns and size-adjusted returns to the investment position. In each year from 1976-95, and within each 2-digit SIC industry, firms are ranked and placed in 10 equal-sized portfolios based on their Q-scores. The year that portfolios are formed is denoted as Year 0. The portfolio formation date is three months after fiscal-year end for that year, by which time annual reports are required to be filed with the SEC. Mean buy-and-hold returns are then calculated for each portfolio for each year, −2 to +5, relative to this date. Delisting returns are included for nonsurvivors. The table reports mean raw returns and size-adjusted returns over the 22 20 years that the positions were taken. The grouping within industry controls for operating risk (to some degree) and the size adjustment controls for the "size effect" in stock returns that has been conjectured as a premium for risk. Size-adjusted returns are computed by subtracting the raw (buy-and-hold) return on a matched, value-weighted portfolio formed from size-decile groupings supplied by CRSP.
The mean returns for years +1 to +5 in Table 5 are positively related to Q. The difference between the mean returns for the highest Q and lowest Q portfolios in Year +1 is 9.03%, or 8.95% on a size-adjusted basis. This is a return to a zero-net-investment strategy with canceling long and short positions in the highest and lowest Q portfolios. The statistical significance of these returns was assessed by randomly assigning firms to Q portfolios in 5,000 replications of the zero-net-investment strategy. The numbers reported for the significance test are the relative frequencies of observing the actual mean differences, or higher, in these replications. It appears that most of the return from going long on high-Q stocks and shorting low-Q stocks would have been earned in the first year after Year 0. Figure 2 indicates that a positive return would have been earned from this strategy every year except 1990, so the results are not due to just a few years in the sample period.
Not only are the returns to the zero-net-investment strategy positive subsequent to Year 0, they are also negative prior to Year 0. The picture that the return reversals present is one of a market accepting the reported earnings of firms uncritically in Years −2 to 0, but reversing its mistake in subsequent years. It appears that the market fails, in part at least, to penetrate the earnings quality due to changes in reserves that are created by conservative accounting and investment.
Some Checks and Further Analysis
We performed further tests to see whether this conclusion survives against competing explanations for the results, and to see whether the results are due to particular features of our research design.
Firms within industries tend to have the same fiscal-year ends, but, if not, their Q-scores may not be available at the same time for ranking relative to each other. So we repeated the analysis in Table 5 with only firms with December 31 fiscal-year ends. The results were very similar. The mean Year +1 return to the zero net investment strategy was 7.71%, or 7.45% for size-adjusted returns. Both returns are significant at the 0.01 level.
The trading strategy, as implemented in Table 5 , may suffer from a "peeking-ahead" bias.
We used Lev and Sougiannis (1996) estimated coefficients to capitalize and amortize R&D and these estimates use data from dates after positions are taken in stocks here, at least for some years. We substituted industry medians when certain sub-scores were missing in calculating the C-score, but median data are sometimes not available at the ranking date due to different fiscal year ends. The Q B component of the Q-score also involves an industry comparison.
Accordingly, we scrutinized the returns reported in Table 5 for these possible biases. We used an ad hoc method for capitalizing R&D, using a sum-of-the-year's digits method over five years to amortize capitalized expenditures. We used the prior year's industry median for calculating C-scores and, when forming portfolios, we compared Q-scores with those of firms with the same fiscal-year end. With these accommodations, the difference in size-adjusted returns between high and low Q portfolios in Year +1 (with significance levels in parentheses) was 7.63% (0.000) and 3.36% (0.018), 2.97% (0.020), 0.36% (0.516) and 3.92% (0.016) for years +2 to +5 for the 58.8% of cases with December 31 fiscal-year ends. A calculation was also made for all firms by forming portfolios every month based on firms with fiscal-year ends three months before, and then weighting the monthly portfolios equally (investing $1 each month) and, alternatively, weighing them according to the number of firms in each month's ranking. The mean, size-adjusted return difference for high and low Q portfolios in Year +1 was 15.27%
(0.004) using equal weights, and 6.34% (0.072), 7.27% (0.056), -0.20% (0.460) and 5.79%
(0.147) in Years +2 to +5. The mean size-adjusted return difference using the weighted calculation was 9.86% (0.000) in Year +1, and 6.22% (0.005), 4.02% (0.039), 1.26% (0.295) and 4.59% (0.042) in years +2 to +5.
One always suspects risk explanations for predictable abnormal returns. Most of the return differences between high-Q and low-Q groups are in Year +1, not the permanent difference that one would expect if the differences were due to risk. (The return differences are positive in subsequent years, however, and significantly so for the size-adjusted returns.) The specification and measurement of risk premiums is elusive. Our control for industry and size attempts to deal with the identification problem. We found, further, that Q is not highly correlated with factors that have been nominated as risk proxies: the mean, cross-sectional correlation between the Q-score and beta, book-to-market, leverage and earnings-to-price are −0.00, −0.04, −0.09 and −0.02, respectively. In Table 6 we report the results of estimating Fama and MacBeth-type cross-sectional regressions, using individual stocks, with a control for factors that have been suggested as risk factors (by Fama and French (1992) , for example):
Where R i,t+1 = annual return in Year +1 after the Q scoring; The year begins three months after fiscal-year end.
B i,t = CAPM beta; M i,t = market value; (B/M) i,t = book-to-market ratio;
(LEV) i,t = leverage, calculated as book value of total assets to book value of equity; (E(+)/P) i,t = earnings-to-price ratio, positive earnings only;
(E/P dummy) i,t = negative earnings dummy: 1 if earnings are negative, 0 otherwise; Q i,t = Q score in year t.
Results are given in Table 6 with and without the Q score in the regression. The mean estimated coefficient on Q is positive and significantly different from zero. We conclude that Qscores forecast returns in excess of those expected from risk factors commonly identified with firms. If one interprets the coefficients on the variables as abnormal returns to investing, it is concluded that Q-scores generate abnormal returns over those identified with those variables.
In further sensitivity analysis, we repeated the return tests with Q-scores calculated from C sub-scores for inventory accounting, R&D and advertising. The results were quite similar, in each case, to those for the composite score. The mean, size-adjusted return for the zero-netinvestment strategy in Year +1 for the R&D subscore was 7.33% (significance level 0.000), 5.22% (0.000) for the inventory subscore, and 4.24% (0.000) for the advertising subscore.
However, in estimating regressions of the form in Table 6 , but with Q subscores rather than the overall Q-score included, the coefficient on the inventory subscore was not statistically significant, indicating that much of the information about future returns in the subscore is captured by the other two scores.
Tests were also repeated using Q A and Q B , alternatively, to take investment positions.
We wished to see how the two performed relatively, and we were concerned that Q B , being at relative levels for variable for the conservative accounting reserve (rather than a change variable, like Q A ) might be correlated with risk factors or with other factors that predict returns. For example, reserves and thus Q B depend on the accumulated amount of R&D investment relative to net operating assets and Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2000) indicate that the market undervalues R&D. However, the zero-net-investment strategy using Q A returned 9.67%
(significance level 0.000) in Year +1 (8.19% (0.000), size-adjusted) and 2.33% (0.049) in Year +2 (1.41% (0.160), size-adjusted), compared with 5.22% (0.000) in Year 1 (5.69% (0.000), sizeadjusted) and 3.94% (0.003) in Year +2 (2.37% (0.047), size-adjusted) using Q B .
Regressions similar to those in Table 6 were run including both the Q score and growth in net operating assets as explanatory variables to see whether the result might be due to growth in net operating assets (which affects the Q A score rather than the change in the reserve). The coefficient in the growth variable was -0.066 (with a t-statistic of -2.42) and that on the Q-score was 0.218 (with a t-statistic of 2.70). So, Q forecasts stock returns incrementally to growth in net operating assets.
A final robustness check involved ensuring that the information on which portfolios are formed in the return tests is available when the portfolios were formed, three months after fiscalyear end. While firms are required to file their financial reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission within the three months, some are late. Table 7 gives mean size-adjusted returns for months beginning four months after fiscal-year end. The returns are for the low-Q and high-Q portfolios in Table 5 and for the difference between the two. It is clear that the Year +1 returns in Table 5 are not due to returns in the fourth month after fiscal-year and when firms may still be reporting. Table 7 also gives the number of quarterly earnings announcements in each of the months. Interestingly, the returns to long positions in high-Q firms and canceling short positions in the low-Q firms tend to be highest in months when there are a lot of earnings announcements.
This, like similar investigations of how apparent mispricing corrects itself [in, for example, Bernard, Thomas and Wahlen (1997) ], indicates the market corrects its mispricing of earnings as those earnings are realized. The association of the returns with earnings reporting also reinforces the interpretation that the predicted returns are mispricing rather than a reward for risk.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is often claimed that the practice of conservatism in accounting produces higher quality earnings. Conservatism yields lower earnings, it is said, and so prima facie these "conservative"
earnings are higher quality. However, conservative accounting with investment growth depresses earnings and accounting rates of return, and creates hidden reserves. Slowing of investment releases these reserves, and creates earnings and higher rates of return. If a change in investment is temporary, the effects on earnings and rates of return are temporary, calling into question the quality --or sustainability --of earnings.
Using a constructed conservative accounting index and a quality of earnings index, this paper diagnoses poor-quality earnings that result from changes in investment with conservative accounting. The quality index forecasts changes, from current levels, of future core return on net operating assets, so ex ante is an analysis tool to discover earnings of low quality.
The paper also shows that quality scores predict stock returns (in the sample period) over those forecasted using measures commonly conjectured as risk proxies. The indications are that the stock market did not penetrate the quality of earnings of firms with conservative accounting during the sample period. Accordingly there were rewards to a quality analysis along the lines in the paper.
ENDNOTES
1 For a recent review, see Healy and Wahlen (1998) .
2 Indeed, earnings quality issues are interesting only when balance sheets are not perfect indicators of value. When balance sheets are marked to market so that book value is equal to value, earnings are of "low" quality as an indicator of future earnings; earnings are, in this case, just changes in value and changes in value are uninformative about future earnings. Imperfect balance sheets shift the focus to the income statement as an indicator of value, and questions then arise as to the quality of earnings as an indicator of the future earnings and thus of value. That quality does, however, depend on how the balance sheet is measured, as explained below.
3 The Gjesdal (1999) concept is subsumed within the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Beaver and Ryan (2000) concepts. But the latter also see conservative accounting in booking persistent positive net-present-value investments such as to yield an accounting rate of return equal to the internal rate of return. We do not have the latter notion in mind in this paper. C-score and Q-score calculations are described in Section III of the text. Year 0 is the year that Q-scores are calculated; years -5 to -1 are the five years preceding year 0 and years +1 to +5 are the five years subsequent to year 0. The Q-score groups are based on a ranking of firms each year on Q-scores within industry and RNOA groups. The RNOA numbers in the table are means over years of median RNOA for each group. Regression coefficients are estimated for 21 annual cross-sectional regressions. The mean estimated coefficients from the 21 regressions are given in the table, along with those at the 25 th percentile (Q1), the median, and the 75 th percentile (Q3). The t-statistics are calculated as the mean of the 21 estimated coefficients relative to their estimated standard errors. ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed t-test. * denotes significance at the 0.05 level using a two-tailed t-test. Q_inv is the inventory subscore. Q_rd is the research and development subscore Q_adv is the advertising subscore. RNOA is core return on net operating assets. Year 0 is the year that Q-scores are calculated; years -5 to -1 are the five years preceding year 0 and years +1 to +5 are the five years subsequent to year 0. The Q-score groups are based on a ranking of firms each year on Q-scores within industry and RNOA groups. The core profit margin and asset turnover numbers in the table are means over median numbers for each group. Mean buy-and-hold returns are calculated for each Q-score portfolio for each year, -2 to +5. The mean returns over the 20 years are reported in Panel A. Panel B reports the mean of size-adjusted returns which are computed by subtracting the raw (buy-and-hold) return on a size-matched, value-weighted portfolio formed from size-decile groupings supplied by CRSP. The high-low return is the return from investing long in the highest Q portfolio and investing the same dollar amount short in the lowest Q portfolios for zero net investment. Significance tests are based on 5,000 replications of randomly assigning firms to Q portfolios. The significance numbers are the frequency of observing returns equal to the positive (negative) return on the high-low investment strategy, or higher (lower), in the 5,000 replications. Regression variables are defined in the text. Regression coefficients are estimated for each month of the sample period, with firms in the estimation for each month being those with fiscal years ending three months prior. Coefficients reported are the mean regression estimates over 240 cross-sectional regressions from 1976-95. * denotes significance at the 0.05 level using a twotailed t-test. ** denotes significance at the 0.01 level using a two-tailed t-test. 
